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1 Why is inversion important?
In their most common form, inversion problems have the form of a+b−b0?. The correct
answer in this case is a. It can be derived without computation because addition and
subtraction of the same number cancel each other out. This solution method, that is, finding
the answer without computation, is called the inversion-shortcut strategy. Many researchers
use inversion problems, related principles, and related problem types to investigate under-
standing by the learners of the inverse relation between mathematical operations. In the
following, I use the terms “inversion” and “area of inversion” to refer to the principles,
strategies, problem types etc. that are related to the concept of inversion. Researchers
frequently emphasize the importance of learning about inversion. However, they rarely
explain why inversion is important, even though this is hardly self-evident.
There are at least three reasons to doubt the importance of learning about inversion. First,
empirical studies show that it is possible to be good at arithmetic problem solving without
having a good understanding of inversion and vice versa (Bryant, Christie, & Rendu, 1999;
Gilmore & Papadatou-Pastou, 2009). To my knowledge, there is not a single experiment that
shows a direct positive causal effect of an understanding of inversion on arithmetic or other
mathematical skills (cf. Schneider & Stern, 2009). Second, inversion problems rarely occur
in everyday life. The reader of this article might try to remember when he or she last
encountered a problem of the form a+b−b (with arbitrary numbers for a and b) in their life.
Most people have troubles coming up with even just one or two examples. Third, learning
about the inversion shortcut might be an inefficient use of learning time. Based on the
existing studies, it can be estimated that using the inversion shortcut instead of left-to-right
computation saves roughly one second, at least if relatively small and easy numbers are
involved. Consequently, if a teacher used only 90 min on inversion instruction, a learner
would have to solve 90×6005,400 inversion problems by using the shortcut strategy before
he gained more time by using the shortcut than he invested by learning about inversion.
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Of course, this argument is provocative. It can and should be questioned. But it demon-
strates that the question “What is learning about inversion good for?” has to be taken
seriously. The answer is not obvious, at least not from the perspective of everyday life,
which is the perspective taken by many students.
The articles in this special issue give some clues as to why an understanding of inversion
might be an important learning goal. The authors argue that the field of mathematical
inversion is ideal for teaching students about how to competently choose and execute an
arithmetical strategy (Robinson & LeFevre, 2011, this issue; Nunes, Bryant, Bell, Evans, &
Barros, 2011 this issue), about how to know and use multiple strategies in a domain
(Peltenburg, van den Heuvel-Panhuizen, & Robitzsch, 2011, this issue), about deciding
adaptively between alternative strategies (Peters, De Smedt, Torbeyns, Ghesquière, &
Verschaffel, 2011, this issue), about acquiring well-organized mathematical knowledge,
about mathematical modeling, and about solving mathematical problems with understanding
(Greer, 2011, this issue; Selter, Prediger, Nührenbörger, & Hußmann, 2011, this issue).
All of the enumerated learning goals have one thing in common: They can be formulated
without reference to inversion. They are all based on the idea that inversion is a relationally
rich area of mathematics, which bodes well for exemplifying general competences and
insights that are important in other mathematical and non-mathematical areas as well. For
example, “deciding adaptively between alternative strategies” is a learning goal that is
important not only for solving inversion problems but also for solving mathematical problems
not related to inversion. This explains—and justifies—why educational researchers and some
practitioners pay so much attention to mathematical inversion.
However, this argument raises two questions: First, is inversion really a highly relational
content area that provides a multitude of learning opportunities? Second, do students use
these learning opportunities to build up correct and highly relational knowledge about
inversion? We can expect a positive effect of learning about inversion only if both questions
have to be answered with “yes”. We will discuss these questions in the following two sections.
2 Is inversion a highly relational content area?
Many authors give examples of how multiple concepts, solution strategies, and experiences
can be intertwined and complement each other in the area of inversion. In line with the
cognitive literature, we are using the words concept and principle synonymously with each
other throughout this article. The same applies to the words strategy and procedure. Concepts
related to inversion are the inversion principle (a+b−b0a), the subtractive negation principle
(a−a00), the subtractive identity principle (a−00a), and the complement principle (a+b0c is
equivalent to a0c−b) (Baroody, Torbeyns, & Verschaffel, 2008), which directly relate to each
other. Inversion is also closely linked to the concept of mathematical groups (Greer,
2011, this issue). Important computational strategies include left-to-right arithmetic
computations as well as the various shortcut strategies that apply to problem types
such as 5+2−20? or 8−80?. Partly different strategies might be needed for addition
and subtraction (e.g., 5+2−20?) and multiplication and division (e.g., 5×3/30?)
(Robinson & LeFevre, 2011, this issue), for whole-number arithmetic and for fraction
arithmetic, as well as for arithmetic problems (e.g., 7+3−30?) and algebraic problems
(e.g., 12+b−b0?) (cf. Selter et al., 2011, this issue). Related everyday-life experiences
are, for example, that making a shirt dirty and cleaning it puts it back in its original
state, that after having taken three cookies out of a jar putting three cookies in later
restores the original number of cookies in the jar, and that splitting a collection of
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objects into two subsets and rejoining the sets restores the original number of objects
(cf. Bryant et al., 1999; Sherman & Bisanz, 2007).
Given this high number of pieces of knowledge which all relate to the idea of inversion, it
seems plausible that inversion is a content area in which learners can acquire many insights
about how mathematics works in general. For example, Greer (2011, this issue) writes
“Inversion is a fundamental relational building-block both within mathematics as the study
of structures and within people’s physical and social experience, linked to many other key
elements such as equilibrium, invariance, reversal, compensation, symmetry, and balance.”
However, learners first need to understand mathematical inversion before they can generalize
and transfer this knowledge and use it as a “building-block” in other mathematical, physical,
and social content areas. Ill-understood and ill-structured knowledge can hardly be transferred
(Wagner, 2006). Do learners really understand how the diverse principles, strategies, and
experiences in this area are connected on a mathematical level? Unfortunately, many empirical
findings suggest otherwise.
3 Do students build up highly relational knowledge about inversion?
A number of studies demonstrate that learners frequently fail to see how different pieces of
knowledge relate to each other in the area of inversion. They do not transfer insights between
situations or problem types and, thus, do not generalize their knowledge. For example,
learners frequently demonstrate selective knowledge of only some pieces of knowledge,
while they lack knowledge about closely related principles or strategies. Other findings are
low inter-correlations of measures assessing related pieces of knowledge and unexpected
developmental orderings.
Schneider and Stern (2009) provide an extensive overview of empirical studies indicating
the fragmentation of children’s knowledge about inversion. For example, in a cross-sectional
study, children demonstrated an understanding of the subtractive negation principle and the
subtractive identity principle already at the age 4 years but did not show an understanding of the
inversion principle before the age of 6 years (Baroody, Lai, Li, & Baroody, 2008), although all
three principles are closely related (e.g., a+b−b0a implies that b−b00). Contrary to
theoretical expectations, preschool children’s counting competence does not seem to
contribute to their performance on inversion problems (Sherman & Bisanz, 2007).
Several studies used a wide range of methods including a meta-analysis of 14 studies
(Gilmore & Papadatou-Pastou, 2009) show that arithmetic skills and an understanding
of inversion were largely independent of each other.
Consequently, learners’ knowledge about inversion consists of many pieces or facets
which are acquired and stored in memory partly independent of each other. Even though
inversion is a highly relational content area from a theoretical point of view, learners’ actual
knowledge of inversion is fragmented, heterogeneous, and multifaceted.
4 The knowledge integration perspective
As described earlier, many authors imply that understanding inversion is a worthwhile
learning goal because this content area is highly relational, and that understanding mathematical
relations in this area might help to understand mathematical relations in general. This perspec-
tive has been termed knowledge dissociation perspective (Schneider & Stern, 2009), because
from this perspective empirically found dissociations between pieces of knowledge are
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considered to be a central unexplained problem. An alternative, and more plausible, perspective
is the knowledge integration perspective (Baroody, 2003; Linn, 2006; Schneider & Stern, 2009)
which acknowledges that learners’ knowledge is usually fragmented to some degree and which
can explain why this is the case. From this latter perspective, knowledge integration cannot be
taken as given but has to be fostered by instruction.
At least four lines of research support the knowledge integration perspective. First, studies
on conceptual change and development traced learners’ knowledge by means of fine-grained
interview questions and category systems. They found that knowledge fragmentation occurs
frequently and in various age groups (diSessa, 2008; diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004). The
degree of knowledge fragmentation decreased with learners’ increasing experience with a
domain (Clark, 2006; Straatemeier, van der Maas, & Jansen, 2008). Most of this research has
been conducted in the domain of physics, but at least two empirical studies (Izsák, 2005;
Wagner, 2006) demonstrated fragmented knowledge about mathematics as well.
Second, according to studies on the acquisition of expertise, the organization of knowl-
edge in memory is an important characteristic that distinguishes novices from experts in a
domain (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998). Learners pick up observations in superficially
different situations. Experts have abstract background knowledge that helps them to under-
stand how these pieces of knowledge relate to each other on a conceptual level. Novices lack
this expert knowledge and, thus, are forced to focus on superficial differences between their
observations (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Thus, the same content domain can look
highly relational and integrated for teachers, researchers, and other experts and simulta-
neously look highly heterogeneous and fragmented for students and other novices.
Third, the limited capacity of learners’ working memory can explain why it takes much
time and effort (cf. Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) to build up well-integrated
knowledge structures in long-term memory required for expertise. Long-term memory has a
virtually unlimited capacity and can store a vast amount of knowledge. However, new
knowledge can only enter long-term memory through working memory, which can store
only a few elements (Baddeley, 1994). Therefore, it is generally not possible to
instantaneously acquire a large and well-integrated network of conceptual knowledge and
to store it in long-term memory. Instead, learners need many cycles in which they load prior
knowledge and new information into their working memory, compare and integrate them,
and finally store the result in long-term memory. During this process the bottle-neck nature
of working memory actually has a useful function: It forces learners to focus on the most
important pieces of knowledge in a situation and prevents them from drowning in a flood of
largely irrelevant information (Cowan, 2010).
Finally, as implied by proponents of the situated cognition view (Greeno, Moore, &
Smith, 1993), low degrees of abstraction and transfer in learners have at least one advantage.
They prevent learners from over-generalizing their knowledge. For example, blueberries are
small, round, blue, tasty, and nutritious. Ivy berries, on the other hand, are small, round, blue,
bitter, and poisonous. Thus, learners who generalize from their experiences with blueberries
that all small, round, and blue berries are good for them will be surprised. The same applies
to mathematics: 5+2 equals 2+5 and 5×2 equals 2×5; but this cannot be generalized to
mathematics in general. For example, 5−2 does not equal 2−5. The term a×b equals the
term b×a when a and b are rational numbers but not when a and b are matrices. Learners
who are careful to avoid these and similar over-generalizations might pay the price of
missing some important opportunities for actually adequate generalizations, for example,
from inversion in arithmetic to inversion in algebra.
These examples show that knowledge fragmentation (a) occurs frequently, in particular,
in novices in a domain, (b) results naturally from characteristics of the human information
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processing system, and (c) has the advantage of preventing learners from potentially harmful
over-generalizations. This explains why many studies have demonstrated fragmented knowl-
edge about inversion. It also raises the question why almost no studies investigate ways to
instructionally support the integration of children’s knowledge about inversion.
5 Implications for theory and practice
On the level of learning theories, there are at least two possible reasons why so far research
on inversion, and research on mathematics learning in general, has largely ignored the
problem of knowledge fragmentation and integration. First, mathematics is widely seen as
a system of abstract inter-relations; and many mathematics educators have a solid back-
ground in mathematics. This might make it hard for them to imagine that the area of
inversion can look completely different, that is, like a heterogeneous collection of partly
unrelated pieces of knowledge, from the viewpoint of a novice. Second, inversion is closely
related to Piaget’s notion of conservation. Accordingly, research on inversion was strongly
influenced by Piaget’s structuralist view of cognitive development (Bryant et al., 1999),
which is best known for its focus on domain-general stages of development and on logical
structures. This might have diverted researchers from the ill-structured and seemingly
illogical nature of many learners’ knowledge in this area. The issue whether Piaget’s theory
can explain knowledge fragmentation at all, for example, by referring to the mechanism of
horizontal decalage, is under dispute (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1989). In contrast, as explained
above, information processing theories of development and some conceptual change theo-
ries can explain the finding of knowledge fragmentation in detail and very naturally
(Schneider, 2012). Future studies will have to examine their power as theoretical frameworks
for further research on inversion.
From a practical perspective, instructional support of knowledge integration is highly
important (Linn, 2006). Students are not blank slates; they already have prior knowledge at
the beginning of an instructional unit. Therefore, teachers have to assess students’ prior
knowledge and monitor its changes during instruction. This formative assessment (Sadler,
1989) can indicate when and where knowledge integration is needed. Linn (2006) conducted
a number of case studies on how instruction can support knowledge integration. She
suggests a four-step approach. First, instruction should stimulate students to elicit their ideas
and make them explicit. Second, teachers should help students to acquire additional ideas
which are more correct from a normative point of view. Third, the students need to develop
criteria for the evaluation of their own ideas. Finally, knowledge integration requires the
sorting out of irrelevant or contradictory ideas from the students’ knowledge base.
Knowledge integration can also be supported by all the approaches that foster knowledge
transfer and generalization, because they help learners to see abstract similarities between
superficially different contexts. For example, diagrams can help to explicate the abstract
structures underlying different contexts (Novick & Hmelo, 1994). Curricula can aid the
acquisition of well-structured knowledge by providing meaningfully structured learning
environments (Hardy, Jonen, Möller, & Stern, 2006).
6 The number line as tool for knowledge integration
Several articles in this special issue point to a representational tool for knowledge
integration, which might be particularly useful in mathematics learning: this is the
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number line. Selter and colleagues (2011, this issue) use number lines repeatedly
throughout their article to illustrate subtraction strategies for mental arithmetic, written
arithmetic, arithmetic with negative numbers, and algebra. Likewise, Peltenburg and
colleagues (2011, this issue), Peters and colleagues (2011, this issue), Nunes and
colleagues (2011, this issue), and Greer (2011, this issue) mention the number line as
a potentially effective external representation for instruction.
This interest in the number line is not specific to research on inversion. As revealed by
cognitive studies, people use analog mental representations akin to mental number lines to
store and process numerical magnitudes. The location in the brain and the neural mechanisms
underlying the functioning of the mental number line are already rather well known (Ansari,
2008). Measures of the mental number line predict mathematical achievement in elementary
school children (De Smedt, Verschaffel, & Ghesquière, 2009). Awide range of studies uses the
number line estimation task to assess children’s representations of numbers. Children are
presented with a number and have to find its position on a number line which has labels and
tick marks only at the beginning and at the end. Performance on this task correlates with
arithmetic skill andmathematical achievement. This holds true for whole numbers as well as for
fractions (Siegler, Thompson, & Schneider, 2011). Interventions designed to improve children’s
estimates on the number line have led to subsequent increases in arithmetic skill, which
indicates a causal link between number line estimation and arithmetic (Booth & Siegler,
2008). Children’s performance on number line estimation tasks can easily be improved by
letting them play numerical board games, where they throw dice and have to count the number
of fields they can move forward (Ramani & Siegler, 2008).
These many links of the number line with inversion but also with magnitude represen-
tation, arithmetic, and mathematical achievement both for whole numbers and for fractions
suggest that the number line is one of the most useful tools for knowledge integration
throughout mathematics. Further studies will have to test this potential.
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